INTRODUCTION
'There is no difference between Kazak and Russian management.' Every manager in Kazakhstan who was asked replied in these terms. As far as they were concerned, there was no such thing as Kazak or Central Asian management; only Soviet and post-Soviet types.
Here we treat this claim as a hypothesis. For the purposes of our argument we accept that in the Soviet past there was no difference. How could there be? Kazakhstan was industrialised by the Soviet Union with Russians imported into senior management positions, key posts in the republic's state administration, and as political leaders. It is possible that 'no difference' remains the case: that there is a common post-Soviet style of management composed of elements from the communist past combined with adjustments amid the transitional market conditions. In a sense were are treating Kazakhstan as a test case. As regards management practices, is the ex-Soviet Union as uniform as its predecessor?
EVIDENCE
Our evidence is from interviews in 2000-01 with the owners, directors or other nominated senior managers in 95 Kazakhstan firms, all from the manufacturing, extractive and construction industries. Eighty-one of the firms were based in Almaty while the remainder were in four other cities. The firms were not a sample but a deliberately balanced selection. They ranged in size from the smallest with just three employees to the largest which had over 3000. Eight of the firms were still state owned 4 while the rest were split more or less equally between privatised and newly created companies. Among the privately owned enterprises, we deliberately selected similar numbers where there was a single owner, a small group of owners, and dispersed ownership. The interviews focused upon the enterprises' human resource practices -their ways of recruiting, training, rewarding and otherwise motivating staff -but we also gathered information about the occupational profiles and breakdowns of the workforces in terms of age, gender and nationality, and about trends in each firm's volume of business and profitability from which a 'success index', which is used in the following analysis, was constructed. There were follow-up interviews, by cross-national pairs of fieldworkers, in 11 of the participating companies, during which issues raised by the general findings from the larger survey, and the situations reported in the re-visited companies, were explored in greater depth.
RUSSIAN MANAGEMENT
We have no new fully comparative evidence about management in Russia. The model of Russian management against which we measure our evidence from Kazakhstan is constructed wholly from the literature. So Russian management in what follows is as alleged, claimed, in the literature, albeit repeatedly in independent studies. We will be treating the clams as basically valid (in Russia) though later-on we shall query just how generalisable some of the generalisations are. However, there has been broad agreement across the numerous studies conducted in the 1990s that management in post-communist Russia has distinguishing features among which we focus on just five.
1. The insider configuration. This is said to arise variously from the frequency with which enterprises have been privatised into the ownership of managers and workers, the influence of trade unions in some enterprises, the interests of national and regional governments in maximising employment and minimising unemployment and the associated claims for benefit, and the prevalent feeling (a vestige from communism) that enterprises belong at least partly to their workers and that managers have no right to separate workers from 'their' jobs. Thus enterprises are said to be run so as to protect insiders which, it is claimed, can lead to grotesque over-manning, low and often declining productivity, and frequent salary arrears. According to this diagnosis, the reforms have been blighted by too little rather than too much shock. Radical restructuring has therefore been delayed. It is argued that invigorating market forces will be projected into firms only when there are powerful external owners who will be prepared, in their own interests, to shake-out labour and shake-up the enterprises (Aquisti and Lehmann, 1999; Aukutsionek and Kapeliushnikov, 1998; Clarke and Fairbrother, 1994; Filatotchov et al, 2000; Polonsky and Aivazian, 2000) .
2. Inflated role of social capital. This is said to be partly a vestige of blat and the informal networks that lubricated the otherwise cumbersome centrally planned Soviet economy, partly a product of the lack of affordable high quality business services under the new market regimes, and the inability of managers to assess anyone's suitability (suppliers, customers or job applicants) other than on the basis of personal knowledge and recommendations. The outcome is said to be that 'who you know' rather than 'what you can do' counts most whether starting-up and staying in business, or getting a job at any level (Clarke, 2000; Clarke and Fairbrother, 1994; Kovaleva, 1997; Ledeneva, 1998; Lloyd-Reason et al, 1997; Muravyov, 1998; Yakubovich and Kozina, 2000) .
3. The normalisation of bureaucratic extortion, otherwise known as bribery and corruption. This is said to have arisen in a context of pathetically low public sector salaries, high tax rates, complicated state regulations, and the absence of a rule of law tradition. Businessmen may often initiate bribes, but only in the knowledge that their overtures will probably be accepted, indeed expected, by state officials. The outcome, according to Radaev (2002) , is that 'successful economic activity without bribery seems unrealistic today to a majority of Russian businessmen'.
Mafia capitalism.
There is talk of mafia everywhere in the ex-Soviet union. Here we mean the Russian variant of the Sicilian original (Varese, 1994 (Varese, , 2001 . These mafia are armed criminal groups. They may be based on nationalities, or state (usually security) services, or just crime itself (Kaliyev, 2002; Volkov, 1999) . They compete viciously with one another and offer protection, a so-called roof, to client businesses, handling all difficult external relationships including (sometimes) with all state departments. With the wealth that this activity generates, mafia groups are then able to branch into other areas of legitimate and illegitimate business. When mafia are powerful, businesses need either to organise their own protection or to pay for protection in cash or kind. The attitudes of most Russian managers -generally pro private ownership but anti-market -suggest a willingness to be realistic and accommodate to rather than resist mafia capitalism (Eberwein and Tholen, 1997) .
5. The nomenklatura effect. This refers to the frequency with which old political capital has been transformed into new economic capital as profitable or potentially profitable enterprises have been privatised into the ownership of senior managers, bureaucrats and politicians. This process has been noted not just in the former Soviet Union but also throughout East-Central Europe. Even where the top communist leaders have experienced socio-economic descent, those next in line have generally done rather well during the transition (Andrle, 2001; Bystrova, 1998; Clark, 2000; Domanski, 2000; Eyal et al, 1998) .
BUSINESSES IN KAZAKHSTAN
1. The insider phenomenon. This was very much in evidence in Kazakhstan. There were many indications of this. First, from a Western perspective the firms were being incredibly loyal to their staff, and the employers took their employees' loyalty for granted. When filling posts, four-fifths of the firms expected the recruits to remain for the rest of their careers, and the employers believed that even more, around 90 percent, of their employees hoped to stay for life. Career-long employment was the norm and an allround assumption.
Second, the more successful firms did not owe their fortune to having made themselves lean and mean. They were most likely to have expanded their payrolls. Twothirds had expanded their manual grades. (Three-quarters of all employees in the manufacturing, extractive and construction businesses that we studied were 'workers').
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More surprising, 26 percent of the firms that had contracted in terms of business had nevertheless enlarged their manual workforces. There had been redundancies in less than 5 percent of the companies. Compulsory redundancies had been extremely rare: this had happened to anyone in less than 2 percent of the businesses. The corollaries of the above were low labour productivity and salaries (an average of USA $150 for managers and professionals, $100 for other office staff, and $80 for workers). Salary arrears had been common. In fact a half of the companies reported that there were such arrears at the time of our fieldwork.
Why was there so much employer-employee loyalty? It was not due to the force of law or government. Nor was trade union power responsible. Trade unions had either disappeared from, or had never been present, in most of the companies. They had some say in pay determination in just 11 percent of the businesses. Nor was a generalised paternalism responsible. Businesses in Kazakhstan had ceased operating as minisocieties, catering for all their employees' needs. Only a third of the firms still provided any kind of health care. These were usually older, larger enterprises that had maintained on-site health centres. Less than 15 percent of the firms had pension provisions for any grades of staff.
The employers' loyalty to their staff arose partly from a feeling that it would be simply wrong, immoral, to cast workers adrift. Salaried managers expressed pride in their own resilience and fortitude, and spoke similarly of employees, when they had stuck by the firms through difficult times, reporting for work daily even when their salaries 9 were months in arrears and when there was actually no work to do. Employers reported suffering feelings of shame when workers had been unpaid, and moreso when staff had been laid-off temporarily. Dismissal was simply unthinkable. The employers would have lost the trust of their remaining employees plus, in all probability, their suppliers and customers.
A second reason for the employers staying loyal was the (factually correct) belief that it would be difficult to replace staff if and when, as everyone hoped, good times returned.
Career-long employment, whenever and wherever it operates, tends to become a selfsealing system. If all firms hang on to their staff, everyone finds it difficult to recruit experienced workers. Most of the firms in our study said that recruitment was difficult, especially the recruitment of skilled specialists. These were among a firm's assets, its capital. Needless to say, all grades of staff had been thrown onto the labour market when enterprises closed (as had been common in the early and mid-1990s). But unemployment in Kazakhstan had remained low. Skilled workers had been gobbled up by surviving and expanding companies. Skill shortages had been exacerbated by the exodus of Russians who had acted on their new freedom to return to what they regarded as their real homeland, as had 600,000 Germans (mostly skilled technical workers and researchers) who had been detained in Kazakhstan since 1941. However, youth recruitment and training had been cut back in the Kazakhstan businesses. The old skilled workforces were not being renewed. Hence the all-round recruitment problems when additional staff were needed.
Certain differences between the Japanese and Soviet variants of lifetime employment are relevant here. The Soviet variant always lacked the functional flexibility of the Japanese version. So in independent Kazakhstan skilled specialists filled, and rarely moved out of, specific workforce niches. In other words., numerical inflexibility was not being compensated by functional flexibility in the workplace. Hence firms' need, as they saw it, to hold onto their skilled staff.
Needless to say, jobs in Kazakhstan were no longer 100 percent secure. As indicated above, workers lost their jobs if and when their enterprises closed. Also, a minority of employers, mostly, we believe, in new business sectors such as information technology, were hiring and firing according to workflows. Their counterparts were the welleducated young people, often with Western orientations, who were forging spiralist careers. However, these jobs and workers occupied just labour market niches which did not necessarily represent the future of the entire economy.
We do not believe that Kazakhstan differs from Russia in any of the above respects.
And we know from studies of beginning workers in Russia and other ex-Soviet republics that a great deal of employment is chronically insecure, and that multiple job holding has become common (see Roberts et al, 2000) . Once again, this seems to apply mainly in new business sectors such as the retail trade, restaurants and bars. However, even employers in these sectors (not unlike their Western counterparts) may believe that it serves their interests to hold onto a core of loyal and experienced staff. The difference vis-à-vis the West is that in Russia and Kazakhstan this behaviour is as much a moral imperative and a self-confirming necessity as an optional business tactic.
We must stress that, given the Russian and Kazakhstan contexts, loyal employers are not usually acting against their own immediate or even longer-term interests. Russian firms where 'the insider configuration' is most pronounced are no less successful than others (Estrin et al, 1998; Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 1999) . This applied among the firms in our study. Loyalty can reward employers. After all, loyal managers and workers will often have far greater commitment than investors to the long-term good of their firms.
2. Social capital. This was extremely important in the firms that we studied. There were several indications of this. To begin with, there was the frequency with which 'connections' were judged 'very important' (by 44 percent of our informants). Hardly anyone said that connections were 'not at all important'. What must be added here is that certain kinds of 'connections' -with customers and suppliers, for example -are important in all market economies, and the UK has its 'old boys network'. It is the other ways in which social capital is used that sets the ex-Soviet Union apart. What are these other ways?
First, there is the extent to which company directors operate their businesses hands-on. They had a say in all recruitment in 88 percent, and in determining everyone's pay in 67 percent, of the companies in our study. They were not setting-up systems then leaving everything to middle-level and junior managers.
Second, roughly one-in-three firms said that 'informal methods' were their preferred way of recruiting staff, and up to 55 percent (for managers and professionals) said that 'personal recommendation' was important in recruitment. This did not mean that jobs were being filled solely on the basis of 'who you know'. Technical skills, academic qualifications, and so on, were also rated as important. It was rather a matter of personal recommendation being regarded as the most reliable guide to a person's skills, and/or a way of sifting among applicants all of whom looked adequately qualified for a job.
However, it was also the case that the heads of companies needed to be able to repay favours.
A final indication of the importance of social capital -in this case the 'strength of weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973 (Granovetter, , 1974 -was the ethnic breakdown of the firms' workforces. Altogether 36 percent of the firms' employees were Kazaks and 50 percent were Russians, which roughly matches the make-up of the general population in Almaty where most of the firms were based. However, the overall ethnic breakdown was not mirrored in the profiles of most firms' workforces. Some were basically Kazak while others were basically Russian. In 15 percent of the firms over 80 percent of all employees were Kazak, and Russians amounted to over 80 percent of the employees in another 11 percent. In other words, one or the other nationality was clearly dominant in a quarter of the businesses.
According to our evidence, the extensive use of social capital was not impeding the firms' business prospects. Hands-on top-level management, and the use of informal recruitment channels and personal recommendations, were related to high, not low, scores on our success index.
Bureaucratic extortion.
Here we encounter our first major Russia-Kazakhstan divergence, assuming that Radaev (2002) is correct about bureaucratic extortion having become difficult to avoid in Russia. It must be admitted that this is a difficult topic about which to gather reliable and representative information in any country. However, 38 percent of the top mangers or owners who were interviewed in our enquiry rated their own most important connections as being with state officials, and another 22 percent with politicians. Some were extremely open, and indeed boasted, about their good connections and how valuable these were. Some of the owners who we interviewed had previously been employed in state departments. Some had actually been involved in the privatisation of the businesses of which they had become sole or joint owners. Others had been recruited by the companies from posts in government economic ministries.
They knew that their connections were among the assets that they had brought to the businesses. It was clear that many of the managers were avoiding bureaucratic hassle by making unofficial payments or doing favours of some description.
However, other managers argued that connections, certainly with politicians and state officials, were not very important, or not at all important, in their own businesses, and that they had decided to stay '100 percent white'. In some cases they may have had little option because they simply did not possess the necessary connections, but in other instances this appeared to be their choice, their preferred business strategy. They were foregoing possible benefits, while avoiding the costs, or building-up connections.
Writing official letters, providing all documents requested, complying with all regulations, and paying all taxes and other charges levied, was one way in which businesses could be run in Kazakhstan. According to our success index, using and foregoing connections were more or less equally successful business strategies, which meant that owners and managers had a real choice.
Mafia capitalism.
There is a glaring Russia-Kazakhstan contrast here. We are not claiming that there are no criminal gangs, or no protection rackets, in Kazakhstan.
However, in Kazakhstan when people speak of mafia they invariably mean the shadows of official state structures. The chains of command are most likely to end in the president's offices.
There is plenty of government in Russia, judged by the number of state officials.
Post-communism has not thinned-out state bureaucracies (Radaev, 1998) . But a large state is not always a strong state, and Russia covers a lot of territory. Moscow and St Petersburg are best regarded as states within a state. Kazakhstan is different. As in other Central Asian republics, the government is more likely to be accused of being repressive than weak. Political power in Kazakhstan is concentrated in the hands of the president, so far the country's only president, and previously a leader of the republic's communist party. Rural areas may be different, but in Kazakhstan's main cities the state is in charge.
The only reliable 'roofs' have official or shadow state guarantees.
Nomenklatura effects.
There is a nomenklatura effect in Kazakhstan. It explains how some of the proprietors in our investigation had acquired their firms, and how some senior managers had obtained their jobs. However, Kazakhstan differs from Russia in that there has been a major change of personnel in the political elite. There has been an exodus of Russians and an influx of Kazaks. This contrast between the old and the new was reflected in the ethnicities of the owners and top mangers in the firms in our survey.
The privatised firms, which tended to be the largest, were mostly Russian-owned and managed. Those in charge had often benefited from their old political capital. However, the new start-ups were mostly Kazak-owned and managed. Here those in charge had sometimes benefited from their links with the country's new political elite.
Also, there was obviously space in Kazakhstan for businesses to succeed strictly on the basis of satisfying the market, and for managers to rise to the top on the basis of their technical competence. There was a generous sprinkling of untypical (in Kazakhstan) management styles among the firms that we studied. Over 40 percent did not rate 'personal recommendation' as important when recruiting any grades of staff. A similar proportion did not regard connections with state officials or politicians as important. Some managers made it clear that they felt constrained, irritated, by the social and cultural obstacles to the reorganisation of their enterprises. The managers who spoke in these terms always regarded themselves as 'Western'. We would query the appropriateness of this label, but this is not the place.
When visiting firms, the contrast between the 'normal' and the self-styled Western was vivid. In the former places there would be immense hospitality -coffee, cakes, mementos -and lots of time to talk. The plant director would have no computer in his own office, but he would have a personal secretary, and there would very likely be a nearby office full of secretaries. In other firms receptions were just as polite, but everything would be accelerated; everyone's time was assumed to have a price. These young managers, who spoke fluent English, knew that they were exceptions in their own country. They made no distinction between Russian and Kazak management. Both were labeled 'Soviet'. Our argument is that there is in fact a RussiaKazakhstan difference, a crucial difference, which creates greater space within Kazakhstan for 'new' types of managers and management, like our self-styled Western informants, and enables them to operate effectively and successfully.
In time, who knows, all the different 'types' of owners and managers in Kazakhstan could coalesce into a unified self-recruiting economic oligarchy. Privileges tend to be passed down the generations in all countries. Alternatively, one or another of the currently distinguishable groups could become dominant. The crucial point here is that since independence in Kazakhstan any nomenklatura effect was been counterbalanced by the space created for former and, in some cases, still, 'outsiders' to enter business and to rise to the top of management structures. We have no doubt that there are such 'new' mangers and businessmen in Russia but in Kazakhstan, due to the specific political and ethnic contexts, the space available must have been wider, and there will surely be more of the 'new'.
DISCUSSION
We accept that the model of Russian management used as a benchmark in our analysis is a caricature, but we still conclude that Kazakhstan is different and that there is no uniform way of running businesses successfully throughout the entire ex-Soviet Union. The caricature matches Kazakhstan realities in some respects but not in others.
Kazakhstan is different politically and in its ethnic mix. Our view, therefore, is that, irrespective of whether this is acknowledged by those concerned, there is indeed such a thing as Kazak management. 'Russian' characteristics are prominent only when they are conducive, or at least not hostile, to the commercial success of businesses in Kazakhstan.
We do not anticipate any convergence with Russia unless Russia changes.
Kazakhstan has no need to change. The economy contracted alarmingly in the first half 19 of the 1990s (DIW, 1996 (DIW, , 1997 , stuttered for several years, but has grown strongly since 1998. It now has a stronger growth rate than any other ex-Soviet economy (Gleason, 2002) . True, this is due to the exploitation of mineral reserves and high oil prices, but Kazakhstan is not the only ex-Soviet republic with oil and other mineral resources. There may be a huge question mark against how widely the benefits of economic growth will spread in Kazakhstan, but we encountered a mood of optimism is the business community. Everyone knew that Kazakhstan remained poor by Western standards, but they also knew that they were doing rather well compared with their usual comparator countries -China, Russia, Pakistan and other Central Asian states. Kazakhstan is now paying off its international debts. The country is not in hock to, required to accept advice from, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. Kazakhstan has become a country with a balance of trade surplus, whose government has a budgetary surplus, and an expanding economy, which enables it to plot its own future.
